Through the lens of assessing the likely regulatory impact of the 2017 EU Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement's amendments to the Directive on Shareholder Rights, this article considers the mythical voice and stewardship role attributed by the EU to shareholders as active corporate governance gatekeepers and drivers of its longterm sustainability agenda. It identifies limitations of the Directive itself and practical challenges concerning the provisions on shareholder identification, executive pay, related party transactions, proxy advisors and shareholder engagement policies. It is argued that there is a considerable normative gap between the EU narrative of engagement and the challenge of engaging shareholders away from self-interest and rational apathy to fulfil a stewardship role.
INTRODUCTION
As Chander observes, 'corporate law is largely motivated by fear of the abuse of control.' In essence, the soul-searching engendered by the financial crisis prompted the EU to seek to bolster the latent potency of the shareholder organ's corrective control function by focusing on facilitating the tools of oversight and weaving a narrative of active investor stewardship. This was done, not just in the cause of encouraging good corporate governance practices, but also to help ensure that management were steering an appropriate course to ensure the long-term survival of companies. Thus the revision of the Shareholder Rights
Directive is consonant with the long-term sustainability agenda embraced by the EU for the 
II. THE GENESIS AND PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE REFORMS
The Shareholder Rights Directive was rights-defining, focused on providing and buttressing substantive shareholder voting and participation rights in service of shareholder democracy, both for its own sake, but also to assist fulfilment of the shareholder body's role as a backstop against potential abuse of delegated power by the board against a listed company's interests. 4 That Directive provided for a basket of shareholder rights exercisable in relation to companies' general meetings for companies trading on a regulated market in a Member State including the right to table agenda items such as draft resolutions 5 and the right to ask questions related to items on the agenda of the general meeting. 6 A decade later, the Directive most of the inserted provisions are enabling in nature, focused on providing or enhancing the milieu for the exercise of shareholder participation rights.
The publication by the Commission of its proposal for a directive on the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement 7 which would add new provisions to the Shareholder Rights Directive can be contextualised as a post-crisis 'shoring up' measure.
It fitted into an EU crusade to improve both corporate governance and financial sustainability of listed companies. One concern was that boards had proved woefully inadequate at selfmonitoring to prevent mismanagement. This dictated a need to find a hook upon which to hang improved corporate governance monitoring. That hook was crystallising a stewardship role for investors. The way forward from the failings of global financial crisis involved placing shareholders front and centre as a watchdog to ensure a more sustainable, long-term outlook. This policy position provided the catalyst for reforms to prod shareholder engagement with a view to fulfilling both (i) good corporate governance and (ii) long-term sustainability objectives.
The EU aspiration is that stewardship founded upon prudent long-term sustainability principles can address market failure to curb short-termism along with executive remuneration and asset management models that incentivise it. This philosophy and policy stance has developed in consultation with stakeholders over time. 34 See note 37 above, Article 2(1)(e). 35 The amended Shareholder Rights Directive enables the Commission to adopt rules to specify minimum requirements in relation to shareholder identification (Articles 3a(8)), transmission of information (Articles 3b(6)), and facilitating the exercise of shareholder rights (Articles 3c(3)).
dissuasive' penalties for this and other provisions. 36 If Member States fail to rise to the challenge, a weak enforcement and penalty regime may well prove a recipe for indifferent and tardy compliance.
An alternative less cumbersome mechanism could have been deployed to achieve the ends sought in terms of facilitating shareholder participation. A more targeted approach could have been utilised to alert issuers to share ownership, such as one modelled on issuer notifications under the Transparency Directive. shareholders, particularly in a cross-border context, which somewhat deflates underlying dialogue ideals concerning investor relations.
IV. INCREASING SHAREHOLDER OVERSIGHT?
Before moving to examine the core concern of the Directive with mainstreaming shareholder engagement on a soft law basis, it is worth separately assessing the regulatory worth of the 
A. Say-on-pay
As part the EU's overarching long-term sustainability agenda and its drive towards improving corporate accountability, the Commission aimed to encourage a better connection between pay and performance when formulating the Proposal for the Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement. The Commission has form in this area, having previously adopted three separate Recommendations on directors' remuneration pushing for disclosure of remuneration policy, disclosure of individual remuneration for both executive and nonexecutive directors, and a shareholder vote on remuneration. being the Commission's recorded dissatisfaction with optimal take-up being confined to a mere six Member States.
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Transparency in the form of a forward-looking remuneration policy, and transparency concerning its application in practice through provision of a backward-looking remuneration report is core to the Directive, as is provision for shareholder voice concerning executive pay.
While the Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement can certainly assist in improving both shareholder and public transparency in relation to director remuneration, particularly variable remuneration, it stops short of regulating the mechanics of how remuneration is set.
In short, the focus is on providing transparency not in directly prescribing how companies should reward their executives. Managerial discretion thus remains vested in the hands of the remuneration committee subject to nationally imposed duties on directors to act in the company's interests. Furthermore, while EU-wide legislative enshrinement of say-on-pay for listed companies sounds radical, as discussed below, the devil here is in the detail, most notably in the form of allowing Member States to opt-out of a binding shareholder vote.
Forward-looking director remuneration policy
The forward-looking remuneration policy required of companies by the Directive is underpinned by the sustainability agenda. Thus the remuneration policy must explain how it contributes to 'the company's business strategy and long-term interests and sustainability.'
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The Directive does not, however, require an outright cap on remuneration or impose other limiting restrictions in service of such goals. Its framework in respect of executive pay in listed companies is markedly less prescriptive as compared with that applicable to credit institutions and investment firms which provides for a maximum ratio of 1:1 between fixed 41 See note 7 above, 4.3 Insufficient link between pay and performance of directors. 42 Article 9a(6) inserted into the Shareholder Rights Directive.
and variable remuneration elements albeit with certain flexibility for shareholder approval of a ratio of up to 1:2. 43 This can be explained by the fact that greater prudential supervision is justified in relation to this category of market players given the potential for systemic risk.
Furthermore, although it has become fashionable to measure executive pay in the form of a ratio judged against that of the average worker, disclosure of this metric is not required.
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Instead the inserted Article 9a(6) indicates that the remuneration policy should explain how employee pay and conditions have been taken into account in formulating the remuneration policy and in setting actual remuneration. Average worker ratios are not, however, without difficulties. 45 More worryingly the Directive is silent on whether exit payments or 'golden parachutes' are caught. By contrast, the much-vaunted UK approach expressly covers loss of office benefits and in the United States it is an element of Dodd-Frank in certain triggering scenarios.
In terms of stewardship and shareholder voice, the provisions which the Directive inserts into the Shareholder Rights Directive on executive pay are underwhelming in terms of ambition. The remuneration policy must be put shareholder vote at least every four years or on the occasion of a 'material change' in the policy. 46 does not receive shareholder approval, a revised policy needs to be submitted and approved at the next AGM. Some important consequences remain to be worked out. While Article 9a (2) indicates that a previously existing remuneration policy remains in place where not approved until a revised policy can be submitted, the significance of shareholder rejection of a new proposed remuneration policy is complex as the Directive opts to leave the consequences and associated procedures as a matter for individual Member States to specify.
Backward looking-remuneration report and shareholder vote
The inserted Article 9b rolls out the requirement to publish a report card in the form of a remuneration report describing how a company's remuneration policy was applied in the last financial year. The Commission is expected to introduce non-binding guidance for companies concerning the remuneration report which will assist with best practice and help to encourage standardisation and thus cross-company comparisons. Accountability in this context involves giving shareholders a right to an advisory vote on the remuneration report to indicate their support or otherwise for how the remuneration policy was applied in practice. 47 At base, an advisory vote against the remuneration report does not oblige a company to take specific action on foot of it in terms of adjusting remuneration. There is simply an obligation on listed companies in Article 9b(4) to account to shareholders in the following year's remuneration report for how the shareholder vote has been taken into account. One can expect an accountability deficit here as this may simply involving boards advising that the vote has been noted and taken into consideration without any measurable outcome deriving.
Respecting the nuances of shareholder voice on executive pay
The exercise of shareholder voice is a nuanced concept in this sphere. In commercial reality executive remuneration resolutions generate unique voting behaviour which is not as binary as voting 'yes' or 'no'. 48 Although the Directive opts not to specify the percentage of majority required to indicate shareholder approval, in market practice in many countries a substantial majority of at least 75% or 80% approval would be a hoped for scenario. In the UK there are plans to mirror market acceptance practices by creating a register to formally log voting records for companies where less than 80% support has been achieved for executive remuneration. 49 There is evidence to suggest that some shareholders appear to hold the view that there is no point in voting on remuneration where the vote is purely advisory. AGMs, the shareholders must be granted an opportunity to vote on re-election of the board.
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Unlike the Directive, this takes the bull by the horns to legislatively embed defined consequences for directors where shareholders voice their continued disapproval.
B. Related party transactions
The impetus for legislating to provide for greater shareholder visibility and approval in relation to material related party transactions originates in a recommendation of the European
Company Law Expert Group. 55 The gamut of circumstances in which related party transactions involving a company and its directors, controlling entities or shareholders arise varies widely depending in part on the level of concentration of ownership in the company and the differences in interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The EU responded to a concern that such transactions may not be in the interests of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders and that therefore greater oversight needed to be given in order to allow shareholders to protect their investment. 
Defining materiality
The Proposal covered related party transactions representing more than 5% of listed companies' assets or transactions with the potential to have a significant effect on a company's turnover or profits. 58 A separate public disclosure regime at the time of transaction conclusion was proposed in respect of transactions representing less than 1% of a listed company's assets along with the requirement to publish an accompanying report from an independent third party providing an assessment of the arm's length nature of the transaction and whether it appeared fair and reasonable from a shareholder perspective. The default exclusion for arm's length transactions made in the ordinary course of business introduced by the European Parliament into the Directive is standard and uncontroversial. 62 Of more interest is the formulation of the option given to Member States in the inserted Article 9c(6) to provide an exclusion for intra-group transactions. It is expressly limited to transactions with wholly-owned subsidiaries. This disappointed those who campaigned vigorously for a broader exemption for intra-group transactions.
Disclosure and approval
Rather than being robustly handled, the level of oversight the Directive provides for of material related party transactions is a rather á la carte affair for Member States. Departing 60 For quantitative measures an anti-avoidance aggregation rule will apply in determining whether specified quantitative thresholds have been met. Thus the value of all transactions with the same related party within a financial year should be aggregated: Article 9c (8) from the lofty ideals of mandatory shareholder approval enshrined in the Proposal, the Directive leaves it up to Member States to decide whether to embed shareholder approval. 63 Disclosure rather than approval is therefore the watchword of the final form of the related party provisions. Even then disclosure to the shareholder body does not have to be ex ante in relation to a proposed transaction, it can be satisfied by an ex post announcement of the fact of the relevant transaction having been entered into and provision of certain information concerning the parties and the transaction. 64 Providing this level of policy discretion to Member States on related party transactions enables the rug to be decisively pulled from under shareholder approval as the ultimate form of shareholder voice despite EU rhetoric concerning the corporate governance imperative of shareholder stewardship. The disconnect does not end there. The Directive as adopted also waters down the independent third party report requirement in that, unlike at Proposal stage, it is not mandatory but optional for Member States to prescribe if they wish (or to replace it with a report from the administrative or supervisory body of the company, the audit committee, or another committee with a majority composition of independent directors).
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Other corporate governance gripes emerge. Although board independence in an approval process is a central concern in related party transactions the Directive misses the opportunity to embed it as the accepted norm. Clear conflicts of interest in the voting and approval process are also permitted in allowing voting participation by related shareholders provided that their voting power does not outweigh that of the independent shareholders.
66
All in all, where disclosure trumps accountability in the form of shareholder approval, the challenge of securing an adequate approval and enforcement regime for related party transactions continues to loom large.
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V. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENT INVESTMENT AND ENGAGEMENT
POLICIES
This section moves to explore the central concern in the Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement with shaping the nature of shareholder investment strategies and engagement. This is complemented by an examination of the handling of the EU's concern with the robustness and suitability of proxy advisory recommendations.
A. Institutional investors
Transparency in relation to how institutional investors (and asset managers) operate takes the form in the Directive of three-pronged public disclosure in relation to investment strategies, engagement policy and the implementation of both of these in practice. The EU objective is that this will aid accountability and help to counteract a lack of engagement by institutional investors and asset managers as well as steering their path away from a short-term approach to investing 68 as high portfolio turnover is considered to be detrimental to dialogue and Parliament's suggestion of an EU-wide stewardship code for investors was not taken up. 69 Nor is reporting of adherence to a recognised code for proxy advisors required.
Investment strategy of institutional investors and arrangements with asset managers
At the kernel of requiring institutional investors to report on their investment strategy is obliging reporting on their long-term approach. The inserted Article 3h(1) requires institutional investors to publicly explain how their investment strategy coheres with their liability profile, particularly long-term liabilities, and how their investment strategy contributes to the medium to long-term performance of their equity investments. This is clearly designed to foster stewardship by institutional investors in place of a simple focus on short-term performance. 70 The Directive sets out its stall on investment strategy accountability as a perceived enabler of its stewardship agenda as follows:
A medium to long-term approach is a key enabler of responsible stewardship of assets. The institutional investors should therefore disclose to the public, annually, information explaining how the main elements of their equity investment strategy are consistent with the profile and duration of their liabilities and how those elements contribute to the medium to long-term performance of their assets. 71 Aligned with this, where an asset manager acts on behalf of institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds, whether on a discretionary mandate or via a UCIT or alternative investment fund ('AIF'), the institutional investor is required under the inserted Article 3h(2) to publicly disclose similar information on the arrangements with the asset manager, enabling an assessment to be made concerning how long-term the investment strategy is. Also of interest is the focus on requiring institutional investors to disclose how any arrangement with an asset manager incentivises the asset manager to align the investment strategy with the profile and duration of liabilities of the institutional investor and to make investment decisions which serve a medium to long-term outlook. 72 How the financial rewards of asset managers are structured can skew them towards focusing on short-term performance benchmarks. However, fundamentally restructuring industry norms by indirect means of subtle pressure on institutional investors centred around transparency is a tall order.
Here again the Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement relies on an optimistic view of shareholder interest in proactively serving broader goals than self-interest might naturally dictate.
Disclosure of engagement policy and implementation
Scholars who favour a director primacy model which leaves boards free to get on with the business of managing typically argue against increasing shareholder rights. 73 Unfortunately this definition focuses solely on the subject-matter of engagement rather than how it is realised. It would be sensible to regard it as indicative rather than all-embracing given the broad spectrum of activities that could fall within the rubric of engagement.
Presumably engagement extends across a spectrum from monitoring to cover all 
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A fear also arises that a sledgehammer has been used to crack a nut. This concern arises in relation to the requirement in the inserted Article 3g that institutional investors annually disclose how they have implemented the shareholder engagement policy in 82 Asset managers are included within the net as they may be tasked with implementing institutional investors' engagement policies and voting preferences. upon a softly, softly approach, designed to build trust between the parties, disclosure of engagement dialogue may undermine its essential deftness, fluidity and focus on achieving a 'win-win' outcome for both parties. Public disclosure may fundamentally change the type and frequency of engagement and more robust and adversarial-type interactions may result. Accordingly, Strand rightly highlights that the public disclosure required by the Directive worryingly risks undermining the success of informal private engagement by institutional investors.
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B. Proxy advisors
In providing recommendations and voting services the proxy advisory industry inherently works against active shareholder engagement by companies. Nonetheless proxy advisory firms have a vital role to play in assisting institutional investors in voting the proxies they hold. Given the strong correlation between proxy advice and voting outcomes, the EU was keen to take the opportunity to set some markers for the industry. Much debate has been generated concerning the need for regulation of proxy advisory firms to ensure accountability and what form it should take. 84 Gallego Córcelos favours mandatory regulation in the form of a registration requirement for proxy advisors coupled with legal duties with hard law consequences for non-compliance. 85 However, the regulatory approach to proxy advisors under the Directive is far less stringent. The Proposal set the tone in outlining that proxy advisors would 'only be subject to some basic principles to ensure accuracy and reliability of their recommendations.' 86
Methodologies
The EU wanted to ensure that proxy advisors are prepared to stand over their contribution as robust and suitably customised for individual clients' needs. The Commission was concerned that in a cross-border context proxy advisors' methodologies might not be sufficiently attuned to the national market and regulatory landscape. ESMA also championed the need to hold proxy advisory firms to account in terms of providing transparent justifications for the approaches taken. 87 Proxy advisors will therefore need to publicly account on an annual basis on their website for their methodologies by providing information in relation to key matters such as methodologies and models employed, information sources, quality control mechanisms, voting policies for each market, corporate and stakeholder dialogue, and conflicts of interest policies. 
Independence
The EU also wanted to tackle the problem of impaired independence where proxy advisors provide services to issuers which may impact upon their ability to provide independent and objective advice. 
Adherence to a code of conduct
The EU has chosen not to provide direct prescriptive regulation of the proxy advisory industry. Furthermore, the Directive falls short of biting the bullet to provide that proxy advisors must follow a recognised code of conduct. Instead a softer 'comply or explain' approach in the inserted Article 3j(1) requires proxy advisors to disclose if they follow a code of conduct and explain any departures from it or explain why no code of conduct is followed.
It remains to be seen how monitoring will pan out at national level. The soft code of conduct model rather than direct regulation follows the lead taken by ESMA -ESMA favoured a code of conduct drafted by an independent committee with large representation from the proxy advisory industry. 90 In 2015 ESMA indicated that the majority of the proxy advisory industry had signed up to the resulting Best Practice Principles. 91 Therein lies the rub: it remains possible for some market players to snub adherence to a code of conduct (or selected elements of a code) so long as a rational explanation is furnished. The regulatory approach taken in this respect lacks teeth because it omits both carrot and stick. Consequently, the selfregulatory nature of codes such as the Best Practice Principles and the lack of meaningful enforcement is problematic.
This could not be accused of being overly intrusive regulation. Creating transparency in relation to proxy advisors' methodologies will not of itself change the level of engagement displayed by institutional investors who rely heavily on packaged advice from proxy advisory firms. It may, however, make it easier for them to stand over acting on recommendations 89 Article 3j(3) inserted into the Shareholder Rights Directive given. More worryingly, the existence of regulation albeit mostly founded upon disclosures, may create an undeserved perception among institutional investors that proxy advisors in the EU are well-regulated and that there is no need to second guess them. As Eckstein has pointed up, the danger with proxy advisory regulation is that it can create an expectation gap -an unjustified public expectation in relation to the efficacy of regulation of the industry.
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This is particularly problematic where regulation is far from robust.
VI. REFLECTIONS ON REGULATORY IMPACT
A. Implementation
The countries such as Switzerland will also have to consider how to respond to differences in treatment.
Implementation of the Directive will not provide an answer to many practical challenges to cross-border voting and participation. As recognised by the OECD, ease of electronic voting and electronic distribution of proxy forms are practicalities that need to be attended to in order to facilitate ease of participation by cross-border investors. 94 This was also documented in the Impact Assessment. 95 Practically speaking, major technical obstacles to voting will continue present themselves in the absence of large-scale investment in suitable electronic mechanisms for voting. In the absence of constraints on this, the likelihood that the costs of facilitating the cross-border participation, voting and transmission of information envisaged by the Directive will be passed on to investors is unfortunate.
B. Shareholder oversight of executive remuneration and related party transactions
The EU's trumpeted role for shareholders as corporate governance agents is dealt a severe financial crisis, make it difficult to see shareholders as being trusted in the role of safeguarding corporate governance.
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A stumbling block to realising the stewardship ideal is that there is no underlying duty on institutional investors to vote or engage. Although the Directive takes steps to enhance the possibility of shareholder participation, it stops well short of legally mandating shareholder voting or other forms of participation including engagement. 102 The result is that the voice of institutional shareholders may be more passive than active, often unquestioningly leaning on the support provided by proxy advisory firms. By contrast, in Switzerland an obligation to vote is imposed in certain circumstances on pension funds. It seems that EU proceeded on the basis that a mandatory approach would lead to mechanistic rather than meaningful compliance. Expecting a principled stewardship approach focused on an investee company's long-term sustainability to be adopted by institutional investors and asset managers is to expect rather a lot. The predominant deployment of porous enabling and soft law provisions leaves the nature and level of shareholder buy-in to the EU's stewardship agenda largely to a matter of rational choice based on a cost-benefit analysis. The EU's call to long-termism and engagement presents no obvious match to basic well-established tenets of corporate governance theory. These include the well-studied shareholder passivity and free rider phenomena. 103 Shareholders who are satisfied with performance are often passive.
Furthermore, in terms of voice, it is well-known that dissatisfied shareholders are more likely to vote with their feet by selling their shares than to engage, ask questions or vote.
Hirschmann's classic thesis is that in the absence of loyalty, shareholders leave rather than 
D. Cultural changes needed to achieve engagement and a long-term focus
The alterations made to the Shareholder Rights Directive focus on creating a basket of complementary disclosures designed to chivvy investors to turn away from short-term investment and disengagement by integrating long-term benchmarks. Whether this approach provides sufficient incentive for institutional investors is debatable. The European Parliament proved alive to this quandary when it stated, 'shareholders' engagement with the company should be encouraged by enhancing their role, but … this involvement should be a discretionary choice and never an obligation.' 110 It would be fanciful to assume that transparency of approach will alone blow a short-term focus entirely out of the water in favour of a long-term outlook. 111 High portfolio turnover is well-ingrained with an EU average holding period for shares of approximately eight months. 112 Ultimately, although the Directive works hard to shift the locus of corporate power, it is not at all clear that all institutional investors will want to take up the stewardship baton thrust upon them. Relying on bringing soft law pressure to bear on an industry relies on culturally shifting entrenched attitudes. A battle for hearts must be won as well as the battle for minds otherwise a minimum compliance approach may be taken. Cultural changes are needed to ensure that investors integrate a long-term sustainability and stewardship approach.
A good example is seen in the UK-based Investment Association's request to companies to stop quarterly reporting and earnings guidance which has resulted in a considerable decline in the practice. 113 
E. Missed opportunities and future policy directions
The Directive stands aloof from the threshold issue of defining who is a shareholder, something which is needed to arrive at a truly cross-border solution. 114 As with the Shareholder Rights Directive, the definition of a shareholder is left to Member State law.
Divergent Member State responses cut across the equivalence ideals for a cross-border investment market. Furthermore, although prominence is given to the need for shareholder co-operation by the OECD, 115 the Directive side-steps the crucial issue of facilitating shareholders to communicate with each other and form alliances on corporate governance matters. This dampens the prospect of activist shareholders gathering support for votes against company resolutions. Resolving the collective action barrier to enable real monitoring is central to achieving peer engagement and proxy activism. There is therefore a pressing need for the EU to revisit acting in concert rules in order to ensure that they do not deter appropriate shareholder co-operation.
Looking to future bigger picture policy and theoretical issues that European company law needs to grapple with, this territory highlights complex unanswered questions concerning the need to move beyond a unipolar rights-based focus to realistically consider the appropriateness of imposing counterbalancing duties on shareholders, particularly majority shareholders. Indeed, as has occurred in the United States, activist shareholders pursuing their own selfish agenda will become an increasing matter of concern in Europe. 116 This terrain raises the need for a duty on shareholders to consider the interests of the company and other shareholders. 117 Shareholder voice may therefore not always mean unbounded freedom. In permitting Member State dilution of shareholder approval and oversight of executive remuneration and related party transactions, the Directive deals a heavy blow to its shareholder stewardship ambition. The tangible effect of transparency alone is difficult to measure but it is no substitute for the control function provided by embedded shareholder approval requirements. It will be instructive to observe the varied implementation choices made across the EU as well as how institutional shareholders and asset managers respond to the gauntlet laid down. In achieving the status of engaged corporate governance monitor and long-term sustainability champion, much depends on investors and assets managers who have not already done so making a paradigm shift to choose to go beyond a minimum compliance mentality. Sunlight helps but path dependence rears its head as a formidable obstacle to shareholders moving away from ingrained self-interested passivity to fulfil the envisaged stewardship role in all its dimensions.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the EU's overarching sustainability goal of eradicating a short-term approach to corporate performance is unlikely to be achieved simply by virtue of soft disclosure-based incentives of the type exhibited in the Directive on Long-term Shareholder Engagement. Law ensures compliance, but in the gaps business has its own way of doing things. The perceived need to shore up the Shareholder Rights Directive by concentrating on encouraging engagement highlights an age-old problem that rights are likely to languish unless the holder of those rights sees fit to exercise them. The exercise of shareholder rights comes down not just to faciliatory regulatory drivers, but also to a complex cost-benefit calculation. Myths aside, rights do not an engaged shareholder make.
